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An Event Study Analysis of Too-Big-to-Fail after the Dodd-Frank Act: 
Who is Too Big to Fail? 
 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
One feature of the Dodd-Frank Act is the elimination of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks.  TBTF is a 
government guarantee of large banks that has been shown to increase the value of these banks, so 
removing the guarantee should result in a price decline of TBTF bank stock.  Using event study 
methods, we find very limited reaction to the process of eliminating TBTF.  Specifically, there is 
limited reaction among the largest banks and banks receiving special attention, such as 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) banks.  Instead, smaller banks not receiving 
special attention show some evidence of negative returns with the elimination of TBTF.   
Keywords:  Too-big-to-fail; Dodd-Frank Act; Event study 
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An Event Study Analysis of Too-Big-to-Fail under the Dodd-Frank Act: 
Who is Too Big to Fail? 
1. Introduction 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed the House of 
Representatives on June 30, 2010, passed the Senate July 15, 2010, and was signed into law by 
President Obama on July 21, 2010.  The purpose of the Act is to “promote the financial stability 
of the U.S. by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too-big-
to-fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive 
financial services practices, and for other purposes.”1
1 See the complete Dodd-Frank Act at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-
111publ203.pdf. 
  We examine the elimination of Too-Big-to-
Fail (TBTF) under Dodd-Frank in an event study framework.     
The explicit policy of TBTF for banks in the U.S. began in the 1984 Congressional hearing 
on the FDIC intervention in the failure of Continental Illinois.  O’Hara and Shaw (1990) use an 
event study and find positive and significant wealth effects when the Comptroller of the Currency 
announced the TBTF doctrine, and importantly the market reaction to the doctrine applied to all 
banks deemed TBTF by a Wall Street Journal article and not just national banks that were 
regulated by the OCC.  Since the failure of Continental Illinois, the TBTF doctrine has been a 
feature in bank risk and performance evaluation and the subject of many research papers.  For 
example, Brewer and Jagtiani (2013) develop size hurdles for banks likely to be TBTF and find 
that banks are willing to pay premiums when the merged bank cross a hurdle to become TBTF and 
was not before the merger. They find premiums of at least $14 billion with positive abnormal 
returns of 15.54%. Similarly, Penas and Unal (2004) develop a asset-based size hurdle for TBTF 
and find that banks achieving TBTF status after mergers have higher bondholder gains, all else 
equal.   
We investigate the effect of the removal of TBTF to determine whether or not there was a 
reversal of the wealth effect found by O’Hara and Shaw (1990).  Specifically, Section 1101 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act amended section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to eliminate emergency funding 
to individual firms, i.e., to end TBTF.  However, in many respects the Dodd-Frank Act is an outline 
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with the specific rules to be developed later, so we examine the evolution of the rules in section 
1101 to determine the market’s reaction to the legislation.  We anticipate a negative reaction to the 
elimination of TBTF as a reversal of the positive wealth effect found by O’Hara and Shaw (1990).   
Our null hypothesis is that the market did not respond to the development of section 1101.  
One alternative hypothesis is that section 1101 eliminates TBTF and the market responds by 
lowering the prices (negative returns) of TBTF banks.  We begin with analysis of each bank in our 
sample because if section 1101 eliminates TBTF then it would useful for future research to 
determine the set of banks that the market believed was TBTF.  Following the financial crisis, 
categories of financial institutions were created that received additional regulation and supervision, 
such as Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI).  We examine these portfolios of 
banks relative to the development of section 1101 to determine if the market views these 
institutions differently.  
Our empirical tests do not find a negative market reaction for the largest banks from the 
elimination of TBTF.  Instead, the overall reaction is best described as a non-event.  As we expand 
our investigation, the evidence is counter to our expectations.  First, Dodd-Frank passing the 
Senate and moving to the President is our most negative event with half of the sample having a 
significant and negative reaction.  However, the negative reaction is spread across all dimensions 
of our sample so this is not consistent with the elimination of TBTF.  Second, amending Dodd-
Frank to go from “general” emergency to “limited” emergency is the first specific move to 
eliminate TBTF.  Eleven of the 55 banks in the sample have a negative reaction to this event and 
eight of the 11 banks are among the smallest portfolio in our sample.  This is not consistent with 
the elimination of TBTF.  Our results are consistent with public opinion suggesting that 
implementation of the final rule to eliminate TBTF did not eliminate it.  Our results suggest that 
banks identified by regulators for special attention are viewed as continuing to be TBTF by the 
market, while other banks may be allowed to fail.   
 
2. Literature and Research Question 
 Market reactions to events such as public announcements, new or changing regulations, 
macro-economic statistics, etc. have been vigorously researched and tested across time.  We 
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review a sample of this literature here.  Our review ends with recent post financial crisis research 
related to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and special groups of 
large financial institutions. 
2.1. Bank Performance and Regulation 
We begin our literature review with some examples of bank event studies.  Allen and 
Wilhelm (1988) and Millon-Cornett and Tehranian (1989) study the effect of the 1980 Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act on banks and find increased returns in response 
to the Act being passed.  Similarly, Cornett and Tehranian (1990) test whether events leading to the 
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 have significant effects on stock returns and 
find that commercial banks and large savings and loans benefited from the Act’s passage through 
higher returns.2
2 Similar studies have analyzed other events such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, 
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 
(See Akhigbe and Whyte (2001); Brook, Hendershott, and Lee (1998); Mehran, Morrison, and Shapiro (2011)). 
  Cyree (2000) examines the diminishing of the Glass-Steagall Act using an event 
study and finds stock prices increased significantly for large money center banks and prices fell for 
small regional banks.  Final removal of Glass-Steagall happened with the passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999, and Filson and Olfati (2014) find significantly positive 
Cumulative Abnormal Residuals (CARs) for diversifying mergers well after the GBLA went into 
effect. 
In general, bank event studies on regulation changes show that the market responds to new 
regulations that change banks’ business or regulatory environments.  We now discuss the findings 
for wealth effects related to TBTF and the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
2.2. Dodd-Frank and Too-Big-To-Fail 
 In September, 1984 the Comptroller of the Currency mentioned a group of at least 11 banks 
that had become TBTF.  O’Hara and Shaw (1990) test market reactions to the 1984 announcement 
and find that the TBTF banks experienced increased wealth effects in response to the 
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announcement.  One purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act was to end ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF).3
3 See the complete Dodd-Frank Act at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-
111publ203.pdf. 
  In this 
section we review the literature on Dodd-Frank and large financial institutions. 
Gao, Liao, and Wang (2018) study stock market reactions to events leading up to the 
passage of Dodd-Frank.  Using the definition of Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
(SIFI) of over $50 billion in assets, they find that these large financial institutions had negative 
abnormal stock returns during the events leading to the passage of Dodd-Frank with more negative 
returns as the bill moved through Congress and passage was more certain.  Gao, Liao, and Wang 
(2018) have a group they call the “Big 6” banks (Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP 
Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo) and the Big 6 exhibit positive returns as the 
Dodd-Frank Act moves through Congress.  Their findings suggest that investors continue to view 
the biggest banks as different and protected in spite of the stated purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act 
to eliminate TBTF banks.4
4 In the non-banking area of insurance, Dewenter and Riddick (2015) find that Globally Systematically Important 
Insurers (G-SIII) have abnormal stock returns of 11.7% for eight events starting when AIG is bailed out during the 
2008 crisis and ending with the identification of the eight G-SIII firms in 2013.  These findings indicate the importance 
of being declared systemically important and therefore TBTF. 
  We note that at the time of passage the Dodd-Frank Act has the stated 
intent to eliminate TBTF, but no specific rules implementing the elimination of TBTF.   
Other studies show the expected response to Dodd-Frank.  Balasubramnian and Cyree 
(2014) suggest that market discipline has improved since the Dodd-Frank Act.  They find that the 
TBTF discount on subordinated debt transactions has been reduced by 94% since Dodd-Frank 
passed.  Akhigbe, Martin, and Whyte (2015) suggest financial institutions have decreased 
discretionary risk taking since the passage of Dodd-Frank.  The largest and riskiest banks are the 
banks that have decreased their risk taking the most.   
2.3. Post Crisis Market Reaction for Special Groups of Banks (SIFIs and GSIBs)) 
The Financial Stability Board and Basel Committee created a set of Systematically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) which includes a set of banks as Global Systemically 
Important Banks (GSIBs) in November 2011.  The creation of the special groups by regulators has 
led to the analysis of market reactions to the creation of these groups.   
                                                     
7 
 
Using an event study, Bongini, Nieri, and Pelagatti (2015) study 70 global banks around 
the development of the list of SIFIs.  They examine three announcements: (1) SIFI methodology, 
(2) the first list of SIFIs, and (3) second list of SIFIs.  They find a positive reaction for the set of 
institutions when the methodology is announced for the set of institutions that will become SIFIs.  
However, when they divide the 70 banks by region, only Europe has a positive reaction.  U.S. 
institutions do not react.  Their regional analysis did not separate SIFIs from non-SIFIs.   
Kleinow, Nell, Rogler, and Horsch (2014) examine SIFIs in an event study similar to 
Bongini, Nieri, and Pelagatti (2015).  Both studies use the same second and third events and both 
find a general lack of market response to these events.  The two studies use a different first event.  
Kleinow, Nell, Rogler, and Horsch (2014) find no market reaction to their first event.  Kleinow, 
Nell, Rogler, and Horsch use a Financial Times article that provides an internal watch list for 
potential SIFIs from the Financial Stability Board while Bongini, Nieri, and Pelagatti use the 
announcement of the methodology to be used to determine the list of SIFIs.   
Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013) find no abnormal reaction in a sample of global 
systemically important banks (GSIBs) and their peer group when examining the market reaction 
to the list of GSIBs being announced.  The event date used is when the Financial Stability Board 
first announced its full list of systemically important banks on November 4th, 2011.  This is the 
second event date used in both Kleinow, Nell, Rogler, and Horsch (2014) and Bongini, Nieri, and 
Pelagatti (2015).  All three studies agree that November 4, 2011 is a non-event for SIFIs and 
GSIBs.  These studies on SIFIs and GSIBs find that the market reacted to the announcement of the 
methodology but not to subsequent announcements of lists.  This suggests that the methodology 
contains the information the market needed to determine the institutions that would become SIFIs 
and GSIBs and the later lists of these sets contained no new information. 
2.4. Research Question 
The extant literature shows that market prices react to legal and regulatory changes that 
impact firm values.  We examine if section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act changes bank values.  
Since the original Dodd-Frank Act was mostly an outline of proposed changes with the specific 
rules left to regulators and supervisors, we examine, using event study methods, the development 
of rules related to section 1101 across time to determine its impact. 
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Traditional event study methods (for example, Brown and Warner (1985)) use a pre-event 
estimation period (typically over 200 days) followed by event analysis.  These methods do not 
work well for analysis of legislation as the events are typically clustered too close together.  
Millon-Cornett and Tehranian (1989) and Cornett and Tehranian (1990) develop event study 
methods for analyzing the development of legislation as used in many studies.  These studies 
examine events specifically related to the progression of legislation.  Dodd-Frank is unusual in 
that the legislation passed, yet many details remain.  Thus, we examine events related specifically 
to the development of section 1101.      
Gao, Liao, and Wang (2018) examine the development of Dodd-Frank.  Their events begin 
with an Obama administration announcement on global financial regulation (January 2009) and 
end with the passage of Dodd-Frank (July 2010).  Dodd-Frank, in the form that passed through 
Congress, specified the desire to eliminate TBTF, but provided no details on how this would be 
implemented.   
We begin our event analysis with the final steps of the passage of Dodd-Frank: (1) the 
initial bill presented to Congress on January 5, 2010, (2) passage in the House on June 30, 2010, 
and (3) passage in the Senate on July 15, 2010.5
5 On this date, Congress was assembled to present the Dodd-Frank act cited as the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act.” This document is formally called H.R. 4173 by Congress.  See 
.   
  Our fourth event is on July 21, 2010 when Dodd-
Frank was signed into law with an amendment to provide only limited emergency liquidity through 
broad-based programs.  The final rules to implement the elimination of TBTF banks (eliminate 
emergency lending to individual banks) were not enacted until November 30, 2015 (Event 9).  
Additionally, there are some milestones directly related to the elimination of TBTF between the 
passage of the act and announcement of the final rules on TBTF, which are detailed in Table 2 in 
the list of events we test. 
We follow the methods from Cornett and Tehranian (1990) to test how the market reacted 
to the development of the rules to eliminate TBTF.  Specifically, our testable hypotheses are: 
Null: No market reaction to the development of the rules in section 1101 of Dodd- 
Frank to eliminate TBTF.    
                                                     
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf
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Alternative: Significant market reaction to rules for section 1101 for large banks. 
We estimate the event study model for the individual banks in our sample and various 
groups/portfolios of banks, some of which receive special attention, to determine the banks that 
market participants believe to be TBTF.  
Brewer and Jagtiani (2013) note that “… there is no such thing as a list of TBTF banks …” 
and that “… the specific TBTF threshold has never been officially defined.”  Absent specific 
definitions, Brewer and Jagtiani (2013) define TBTF in three ways: 1) if the bank has total assets 
greater than $100 billion, 2) if the bank is one of the 11 largest banks, and 3) if the market value 
of equity is greater than $20 billion.  Alternatively, Penas and Unal (2004) suggest that a bank with 
total assets of more than 2% of all depository assets is TBTF and a bank with less than 0.35% of 
all depository assets are clearly not TBTF.  These definitions are reasonable, yet arbitrary. 
Kane (2000) suggests that very large banks are “… more likely to receive favorable 
treatment by both the market and regulators during a financial crisis.”  Dodd-Frank is intended to 
eliminate favorable treatment of TBTF banks by regulators and the market should respond by 
decreasing the value of TBTF banks.  The list of banks that the market devalues with the 
elimination of TBTF may not match the set of large banks that regulators would be willing to 
bailout.  However, the list of banks that exhibit market reactions provides the set of banks whose 
securities prices included a TBTF premium.  Thus, determining this group of TBTF banks are 
important to future research and public policy discussions.   
Therefore, it is an empirical question as to how the market defines TBTF banks, and that 
is what we investigate.  We use two methods to study what banks the market believes have a TBTF 
premium: 1) estimate individual bank reactions, and 2) separately form bank portfolios based on 
pre-identified bank groups such as SIFI banks.  Using these two methods allows results from 
hypothesis tests to be robust to the potential for incorrect classification.  
 
3. Data and Methods 
In this section, we discuss the data and methods used to study the wealth effects of the 
removal of TBTF from banks, and which banks are considered TBTF by market participants.  
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3.1. Data: Bank Selection 
In order to analyze the impact the Dodd-Frank Act had on TBTF banks, we first collect 
Report of Condition and Income data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago on all commercial 
banks for December 2009, which is the quarter preceding the drafting of the Dodd-Frank Act.  We 
then aggregate data at the holding company level in order to match bank characteristics with the 
PERMCO-RSSD link from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  The resulting list of banks is 
then merged with the CRSP daily stock file from December 1, 2009 through December 31, 2015 
for a total of 1,532 trading days.6
6 December 31, 2015 is the latest available data for daily stock prices at the time the study was conducted. 
  Consistent with Cornett and Tehranian (1990) and Cyree (2000) 
we keep only banks, which trade every day over the sample period, resulting in a total of 271 
banks.   
We are concerned with how the Dodd-Frank Act might have affected market perceptions 
of banks considered TBTF.  Within sections 165 and 166 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal 
Reserve was required to enhance scrutiny on banks with $50 billion or more in total assets.7
7 One example came during the testimony before Congress of Michael Gibson, Director of Banking Supervision and 
Regulation, on May 16, 2012.  The banks above this asset threshold were subject to “enhanced prudential standards.”  
Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/gibson20120516a.htm.  
  In 
addition to the $50 billion classification, section 165 also requires that banks with more than $10 
billion in total assets to have company-run stress tests beginning in October, 2013 with a one year 
transition period.  Therefore, in order to ensure we capture any effect from the Dodd-Frank Act on 
those banks that are likely to be considered TBTF, we include all banks with more than $10 billion 
in total assets.  We also include any bank identified by InvestSnips as a mid- or large-cap bank not 
already present in the sample.8
8 The list includes the Bank of the Ozarks, F.N.B. Corporation, Home BancShares, Iberiabank Corporation, SVB 
Financial Group, Umpqua Holdings Corporation, United Bankshares, and Western Alliance Bancorporation. 
,9
9 We do not include stocks below the mid-cap level to ensure we do not include stocks that are not traded frequently 
or may be wholly owned.  In support of this, we find that the median (average) volume per day in the excluded group 
is 13,224 (438,439) shares compared to 1,280,631 (9,146,807) shares for the stocks in the sample.   
  Our final sample includes a total of 55 banks.  In general, these 
banks are very large compared to the industry as a whole, and represent the most likely banks to 
be considered TBTF by the market. 
Gao, Liao, and Wang (2018) examine “Systemically Important Financial Institutions” and 
they include large financial institutions with SIC codes from 6000 through 6999.  This set of SIC 
codes includes: banks, non-deposit credit institutions, securities firms, insurance, real estate, and 
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other financial institutions.  Their sample includes all the banks in our sample with more than $50 
billion in assets except for Discover Financial Services.  However, their sample also includes a 
number of insurance companies, such as AIG, CIGNA and Prudential that are not in our sample 
of banks. 
The Dodd-Frank Act, as well as other regulatory actions, creates sets of banks for special 
attention.  The different groups of banks receiving special attention are the following.  First, in 
November 2011 the Financial Stability Board and Basel Committee announce the first set of 
Systematically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) which includes a set of banks as Global 
Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs).  Bongini, Mieri and Pelagatti (2015) note the Financial 
Stability Board oversees SIFI rules while the Basel Committee oversees GSIB rules.  We have 
eight GSIBs in our U.S.-only sample: JP Morgan/Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, 
BNY Mellon, State Street, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley.10
10 The original list of GSIBs from November 2011 includes 29 large financial institutions from around the world.  Of 
the global set of 29 institutions eight are U.S. firms.  Those eight firms are the set of GSIBs used in our analysis. 
  We compare this group to the 
remaining 47 banks with the notion that there is little doubt that these institutions are considered 
TBTF banks, and any market reaction should be within this group if TBTF is removed.  We note 
for comparison that Gao, Liao and Wang (2018) examine a group of “Big 6” banks.  Their Big 6 
banks are all included in our eight GSIBs.  The two banks in our GSIB list, but not in their Big 6 
list, are BNY Mellon and State Street. 
Second, the Federal Reserve created the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (better 
known as stress-testing) to assess the capital adequacy of large U.S. financial institutions in the 
event of another major financial downturn.  Balasubramnian and Cyree (2014) use this set of banks 
required by the Federal Reserve to conduct stress tests in February, 2009, which is prior to our 
sample.  We follow their lead and use this set of banks as our stress-tested banks.  This set of banks 
includes all the banks in our GSIB group, as well as American Express, BB&T, Capital One 
Financial, Fifth Third, Keycorp, MetLife, PNC Financial Services, Regions Financial, SunTrust 
Banks, and U.S. Bancorp for a total of 18 banks.11
11 GMAC/Ally was in the original set of 19 banks in 2009.  GMAC/Ally is not in our sample.  The reason is that 
GMAC stock returns do not exist in WRDS and Ally stock returns begin in April 2014.  We require daily returns 
across our sample period for inclusion in our final sample, so Ally is excluded from our analysis. 
  It is plausible that these 18 banks could be 
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considered TBTF. We compare this group to the remaining banks, which are not in the stress-
tested sample.   
Third, the banks identified for stress-testing under the Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Program is different from the requirement in Dodd-Frank Act that all banks with more than $50 
billion in total assets receive enhanced scrutiny. Accordingly, we divide the sample into three 
groups based on asset size with breakpoints at $1 trillion and $50 billion.  There are four banks 
with more than $1 trillion in total assets, 17 banks with total assets less than $1 trillion but greater 
than or equal to $50 billion, and 34 banks with total assets less than $50 billion.  Using different 
asset size groups allows us to determine the size that the market considered to be TBTF. 
The list of the 55 banks in our sample appears in Table 1 along with their total assets from 
December 2009.  The list is presented in order of decreasing total assets.  
3.2 Timeline 
This section provides the timeline of events that we examine in the evolution of the 
elimination of TBTF under Dodd-Frank.  Before discussing the timeline, we provide some 
background on section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act and its amendment by Section 1101 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.   
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act provides the emergency lending authority to the 
Federal Reserve.  Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, section 13(3) provided for emergency lending to 
any individual, partnership or corporation subject to four conditions that provided the authority for 
the Federal Reserve’s various financial crisis lending programs and allowed for TBTF bailouts. 
 Section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended section 13(3) to limit emergency lending to 
broad-based programs and facilities that relieve liquidity pressures in financial markets.  Limiting 
authority to “broad-based programs” that “relieve liquidity pressures” is intended to eliminate 
TBTF.  However, this statement allows a great deal of room for interpretation, and critics suggest 
it provides enough room to bailout large banks.  When the draft of the rules for implementing 
section 1101 were provided for public comment on December 23, 2013, concerns continued about 
the possibility to bail out large banks.  Public comments were due by March 7, 2014 with the final 
rules announced on November 30, 2015.  The final rules include a number of specific restrictions 
including: 
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1. Defining broad-based to be: 
a. An identifiable market or sector of the financial system, 
b. At least five firms must be eligible to participate, and 
c. Not be designed to assist any number of firms to avoid bankruptcy. 
2. Programs cannot lend to insolvent firms and further defines insolvency to include 
borrowers not paying their debt as they come due over the previous 90 days. 
3. Not lending to companies borrowing for the purpose of lending to insolvent companies. 
4. Specify that emergency loans must be made at a penalty rate. 
5. Each emergency program must be reviewed every six months and must be terminated 
within one year of start or last review. 
6. All programs must have prior approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.  
The restrictions are designed to prevent bailouts of failing firms and eliminate TBTF. 
 Following the final set of rules, critics continue to complain that the rules do not eliminate 
TBTF.  For example, in 2016 the Chair of the House Committee on Financial Services Jeb 
Hensarling introduced the Financial CHOICE Act that includes a section titled “Ending Too Big 
to Fail and Bank Bailouts.”  Thus, the elimination or continued existence of TBTF is an ongoing 
question.   
We examine the market’s view on the rules to eliminate TBTF in an event study 
framework.  Accordingly, we next provide the timeline of the relevant events.  The timeline of 
events for TBTF elimination under section 1101 are listed in Table 2.   
The first event in our timeline is the presentation of the Dodd-Frank Act to Congress that 
includes the statement that the policy of TBTF is coming to an end.  We expect a negative reaction 
to the end of TBTF, but this announcement is not “clean” as it is part of the announcement on the 
overall Dodd-Frank Act.  Event 4 is a specific rule to move toward elimination of TBTF.  We 
expect a negative reaction to this rule.  Event 5 is the announcement of the proposed rules to 
implement section 1101 and therefore to eliminate TBTF.  This is the first announcement to move 
toward operationalizing the elimination of TBTF and we expect a negative reaction.  Events 6 and 
7 are specific concerns about section 1101 sent to the Fed Chair by a House committee (6) and by 
group of Senators (7).  The final event (Event 9 on November 30, 2015) in our timeline is the 
announcement of the final rules to implement section 1101 that will go into effect on January 1, 
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2016.  This is the specific elimination of TBTF.  We expect a negative reaction to this event if the 
market finds any information in the final rule. 
 
3.3. Other Events, Anticipated Events, and Contaminated Events 
Our set of events include only events specifically related to the passage of Dodd-Frank and 
the subsequent development of the rules to implement the elimination of TBTF in section 1101 of 
Dodd-Frank.  There are many events following the crisis related to issues with large banks.  For 
example, Bongini, Mieri and Pelagatti (2015) examine events related to the development of the 
list of SIFIs.  These events directly impact the value of these institutions, but have nothing to do 
with the development of section 1101 of Dodd-Frank and we account for these “noisy” events 
econometrically via the model intercept.  
Once we have identified the events related to the development of section 1101 of the Dodd-
Frank Act, we still need to be careful about the timing of events and whether the events are 
contaminated.  The issue with timing is whether we have correctly identified when the event 
became public.  If we miss the release date of the information then our methods will miss the 
impact of the information on returns.  Since we are examining large publicly traded banks during 
a time when banks received a lot of attention, we do not believe the market would react slowly to 
new information.  Instead, we are concerned with anticipated events where the market was aware 
of the information before its specific release.  Our first four events are acts of Congress and these 
are difficult to anticipate.  The last five events relate to internal workings of the Fed and 
Congressional responses.  These are also difficult to anticipate.  Accordingly, we do not believe 
there is an issue with our events being anticipated well in advance.   
Since we examine large publicly traded banks, there is a substantial amount of information 
released regularly for the firms in our sample.  This creates the concern that events may be 
contaminated with the release of other valuable information.  We use Bloomberg news to review 
all nine of our events windows across all 55 banks in our sample for contaminating information.  
We find contaminated events for the following banks:   American Express event 8; Bank of 
America events 1, 4, 6, and 9; BB&T event 7; Citigroup event 9; Goldman Sachs events 2, 3, 4, 
and 9; JP Morgan event 5; and Morgan Stanley event 5.  In the individual bank analysis we zero 
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out the event dummy for the contaminated events.  For the group analysis we zero out the bank 
returns in the group portfolio for each contaminated event.    
3.4. Methods 
Cornett and Tehranian (1990) examine the impact of the development of Garn‐St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 on the value of commercial banks and savings and loans.  We 
follow the Cornett and Tehranian methods and estimate the following event study model from the 
drafting of the Dodd-Frank Act through the announcement of the rule that eliminates TBTF.  We 
estimate the model for each of the 55 banks in our sample in a system of seemingly unrelated 
equations (SUR methods).   
∑
∑
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where  
tiR , is the daily return for bank i on day t (T=1,532 daily observations from December 1, 
2009 through December 31, 2015), 
tRm  is the daily return for equally-weighted CRSP index on day t, 
tkD , is a dummy variable equal to one for the kth event using an event window of [-2, +2],12
12 Bongini, Mieri and Pelagatti (2015) use a [-2, +2] event window for their primary results.  Bongini, Mieri and 
Pelagatti (2015) use the [-2, +2] window in their secondary results using methods similar to ours and find results 
consistent with their primary results.  For completeness, we also estimate our model using a variety of event 
windows.  Our results are qualitatively similar across the various windows.  
 
tI  is a dummy variable equal to one on the day of change in the discount window target 
rates and the day before.13
13 On December 16, 2015 the Federal Reserve announced that it was going to raise the discount rate target by 25 
basis points.  An increase in interest rates typically reduces bank stock values resulting in negative returns, so we 
need to control for this event.   We include this event as a control variable in our analysis following Flannery and 
James (1984). 
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In addition to the SUR estimation on the individual banks we also estimate the model for various 
groups of banks.  The different groups include: (1) GSIBs vs. non-GSIBs, (2) Stressed-tested vs. 
non-Stress tested, and (3) by asset size: greater than or equal to $1 trillion, less than $ 1 trillion to 
greater than or equal to $50 billion, and less than $50 billion.   
 
4. Results 
The empirical results are contained in this section for individual banks and groups of banks. 
 
4.1. Individual Bank Results 
Our research question is whether or not large banks’ (based on asset size) stock prices 
responded to the elimination of Too-Big-to-Fail.  We begin with the estimation of equation (1) on 
the 55 large banks in our sample in a system of seemingly unrelated equations.  The results from 
the estimation of equation (1) are reported in Table 3.  Table 3 lists the banks in the same order as 
Table 1 and provides the total assets from Table 1 for ease of reference.  To keep the table 
manageable, we report only the parameter estimates on the 9 events.  Not reported in Table 3 are 
the market parameter estimates and the target rate parameter estimates.  The parameter estimates 
for current market returns is significant and positive across all banks.  The parameter estimates on 
the target rate change are insignificant across all banks.   
Table 3 reports the event results for each of the 9 events listed in Table 2.  To make it easier 
to identify the significant results we highlight all parameter estimate that are significant at the 10% 
level or better and then label the level of significance.  Contaminated events (listed in section 3.3.) 
are left blank. 
Our events 2 and 3 align with events 15 and 16 from Gao, Liao and Wang (2018), so we 
will begin our discussion here for comparison.  Gao, Liao and Wang (2018) find significant and 
negative abnormal returns for SIFIs across both events 15 and 16.  They include large U.S. 
financial institutions with SIC codes from 6000 through 6999.  Additionally, they provide an 
analysis of abnormal returns for banks in aggregate across their events 13 through 16.  The 
abnormal returns for Big 6 banks across these events is not different from zero, while the abnormal 
return for the non-banks is significant and negative across these events.  In cross-sectional analysis 
the Big 6 banks show positive returns across events 13 through 16.     
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Event 2 has only seven significant parameters estimates across our 55 banks with five 
negative and two positive.  These seven significant coefficients are spread across different sized 
banks and different groups of banks.  These results suggest that Event 2 (House approval of the 
final Dodd-Frank bill) is a non-event for large U.S. banks.  Our results indicate that the negative 
and significant returns for the corresponding event in Gao, Liao and Wang (2018) are driven by 
non-bank financial institutions. 
Event 3 (Dodd-Frank passes the Senate) has 28 significant parameter estimates and all 28 
are negative.  Only three of the Big 6 banks examined in Gao, Liao, and Wang (2018) have a 
significant parameter estimate.  Our results suggest that the negative abnormal returns for Event 
16 in Gao, Liao and Wang (2018) are likely from non-bank financial institutions. 
Event 3 has by far the largest number of significant parameter estimates, so we need to 
discuss Event 3 further.  Event 3 is Dodd-Frank passing the Senate and being sent to the President. 
This event suggests that Dodd-Frank is likely to become law and we observe 28 significant and 
negative parameter estimates from 54 banks (Event 3 is contaminated for Goldman Sachs).  Our 
average return for Event 3 is -0.0102, while the TBTF event return from O’Hara and Shaw (1990) 
is 0.0131.  The O’Hara and Shaw return is from becoming TBTF.  The question is whether our 
Event 3 could be from the elimination of TBTF or something else such as the increased compliance 
costs coming from Dodd-Frank.  If the negative return from Event 3 is from the elimination of 
TBTF we would expect all the GSIBs and stress-tested banks to show negative returns.  We find 
only half of the GSIBs and two-thirds of the stress-tested banks have negative parameter estimates.  
In addition, two-thirds of the banks with total assets of less than $50 billion have negative 
parameter estimates.  Thus, the negative parameter estimates on Event 3 are unlikely to represent 
a market response associated strictly with the elimination of TBTF. 
Our expectation is that event 1 (presenting of Dodd-Frank Act to Congress), Event 4 
(changing “general” emergency to “limited” emergency), Event 5 (public notice of operating rules 
for section 1101) and Event 9 (final rules implementing section 1101 to end TBTF) are more likely 
to be significant events as they suggest new information in developments leading to rules that 
eliminate TBTF, so we turn our discussion to these four events.     
Event 1 is the presentation of the Dodd-Frank Act to Congress that includes an outline for 
the elimination of TBTF, which should be a negative event for large banks.  However, the Dodd-
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Frank Act is a wide-ranging bill and therefore not a clean event for TBTF, so we are agnostic as 
to the market reaction to the presenting of the bill.  Table 3 reports 13 significant parameter 
estimates out of the 55 banks in our sample for Event 1.  Of the 13 significant parameter estimates, 
nine are positive in contrast to the expected negative estimates if TBTF is eliminated.  The positive 
parameter estimates are concentrated among the banks in our sample with assets exceeding $50 
billion. 
Event 4 changed “general” emergency lending to “limited” emergency lending in an 
attempt to eliminate TBTF. We expect a negative reaction, especially from larger banks. We find 
14 significant parameter estimates across the 55 banks with 11 being significantly negative. None 
of the eight GSIBs have significant parameter estimates and only one stress-tested bank (BB&T) 
has a significant and negative parameter estimate.  Eight of the 11 negative parameter estimates 
are for banks with less than $50 billion in total assets.  This is consistent with the probability of 
bailouts declining only for banks less than $50 billion, but not the largest banks in the sample.  
Event 5 is the public announcement of the proposed rules to implement section 1101 of 
Dodd-Frank.  We expected a negative reaction as the market learns that specific rules are written 
to operationalize section 1101.  There are no significant parameter estimates for Event 5. Event 5 
results suggests that the public announcement of a set of rules designed to eliminate TBTF was a 
non-event.   
Event 9 is the final rule to eliminate TBTF.  Our expectation is that the market will react 
negatively to the removal of the large-bank safety net.  All but two (Cullen/Frost and International 
Bancshares) of the parameter estimates on Event 9 are insignificant.  This indicates that the market 
did not respond to the final rule to eliminate TBTF for large banks.  The lack of a market reaction 
to the final rule suggests that there was no additional information in the final rule.   
All the parameter estimates for events 6, 7 and 8 are insignificant.  These results indicate a 
series of non-events. 
Finally, we estimate all nine events together as a global event.  The global event has 18 
significant parameter estimates across the 55 banks and all 18 are negative.  The significantly 
negative parameter estimates are concentrated among the smaller banks with nine significantly 
negative parameters among the 13 smallest banks in our sample.  Among the GSIBs, only Bank 
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of America has a significant parameter estimate.  The overall results suggest that, on average, any 
negative effect of implementing rules to eliminate TBTF falls on the smaller banks in our sample 
instead of the largest banks in the U.S. 
4.2. Group Results 
Since we do not know what banks are specifically designated as too-big-to-fail, we cannot 
form groups based on the actual banks declared TBTF by regulators.  However, regulators and 
policymakers identify different groups of banks for analysis and special treatment.  As we describe 
above in the data section, we test for market reactions from three groups of banks: (1) GSIBs vs. 
non-GSIBs, (2) Stressed-tested vs. non-Stress-tested, and (3) by asset size: greater than or equal to 
$1 trillion, less than $ 1 trillion to greater than or equal to $50 billion, and less than $50 billion.  
Table 4 provides the results from each grouping.  Each group is treated as an equally-weighted 
portfolio.  Contaminated events are set to zero in each portfolio. 
Table 4 contains two panels and a large number of parameter estimates.  In the interest of 
brevity we will only discuss significant results.  We continue to discuss results by event.  Event 1 
is significant and positive for all groups of banks except for those with less than $50 billion in total 
assets.  The parameter estimate is not significant for the smallest banks.  Event 3 is significant and 
negative for all of our groups of banks except for GSIBs and banks with more than $1 trillion in 
total assets.  The other events are non-events for all the groups of banks.  The significant 
parameters in Table 4 suggest that Dodd-Franks is a positive for the “special attention banks” and 
limiting emergency lending is a negative event for smaller banks in our sample. 
4.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 5 provides a frequency chart for the full sample and the various subsets of the sample 
of significant positive event parameters, significant negative event parameters and insignificant 
parameters for each individual bank.  This summary provides additional information to support 
the event-study results in Tables 3 and 4.  Events 1, 3, and 4 have, by far, the largest number of 
significant parameter estimates, so we will discuss these events in detail here. 
Event 1 has nine significant and positive and four significant and negative parameter 
estimates across the 55 banks as shown in Table 3.  Looking across the different sets of banks for 
Event 1, four of the positive parameter estimates are for Stress-tested banks.  Three of the four 
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negative parameter estimates are for small banks (assets < $50 billion).  This suggests that the 
special identification of Stress-tested banks is viewed positively by the market while the lack of 
special identification is viewed negatively. 
Event 3 has 28 significant and negative parameter estimates, which is half of the sample and 
the event with by far the largest number of significant parameter estimates.  The negative parameter 
estimates span across the various dimensions of the sample.  Since Event 3 spans the sample, it is 
unlikely to be a negative market response strictly to the elimination of TBTF. 
Event 4 has three significant and positive parameter estimate and 11 significant and negative 
parameter estimates across the 55 banks as shown in Table 3.  There are no significant and negative 
parameter estimates for GSIBs.  There is only one significant and negative parameter estimate 
among the 18 stress-tested banks (BB&T: $160 bil.).  However, 8 of the 11 significant and negative 
parameter estimates are for smaller banks (assets < $50 billion).  Event 4 is the change from 
“general” emergency lending to “limited” emergency lending. 
 Across the other events there are only two significant parameter estimates: both on Event 
9 and both negative.  This suggests that remaining potential events are non-events. 
4.4.  Robustness 
 We conduct a variety of tests for robustness.  Specifically, we examine alternative event 
windows and include a risk-shift variable in the model.  None of these tests create materially 
different results, so these results are not included in the interest of brevity.   
One robustness check warrants a brief discussion.  Event 3 (Dodd-Frank passed by the 
Senate and sent to President Obama for signing) exhibits the largest number of significant 
parameter estimates and all the significant parameters are negative.  This is a noisy event about 
the Dodd-Frank Act and not an event specific to the elimination of TBTF.  We examine Event 3 
in a cross-sectional regression.  The purpose of this analysis is to determine if the parameter 
estimates (abnormal returns) for each bank from Event 3 are the result of some banks being 
“special.”  We test for a “special” explanation through dummy variables for banks in the various 
regulatory groups while controlling for some standard bank performance measures.  The results 
are presented in Table 6. 
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Model 1 in Table 6 contains the control variables and a dummy variable for GSIBs.  The 
GSIB variable is insignificant suggesting Event 3 is not related to TBTF.  Total Assets is 
significant and negative suggesting that larger banks had a more negative reaction.  Model 2 
contains a dummy variable for stress-tested banks and it is significant and negative.  This suggests 
that stress-tested banks exhibit a more negative reaction to Event 3, all else constant.  The Loan 
ratio is also significant and negative suggesting that banks with more loans had a more negative 
reaction to Event 3.  This is consistent with increased compliance costs related to larger loan 
portfolios. Model 3 contains dummy variables for asset size of banks so we drop the Total Assets 
control variable.  The parameter estimates on the dummy variable for banks with assets over $1 
trillion is significant and positive for Event 3 suggesting that the largest banks exhibit a less 
negative reaction.  Loans continue to be significant and negative while capital is also significant 
and negative.  The results from our cross-sectional analysis of Event 3 are mixed across the 
different groups of “special” banks relative to the elimination of TBTF and thus consistent with 
our other results.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA)  was to “promote the financial stability of the 
U.S. by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too-big-to-fail’, 
to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices, and for other purposes.”14
14 Reference in footnote 3. 
  We examine one purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act-
the intent to end ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF).  TBTF implies special protections to prevent the failure 
of large banks.  Special protection against failure for large banks reduces the risk of banks that are 
TBTF and therefore should increase the value of these banks.  Previous research supports the 
increase in value of banks that are deemed TBTF.  The Dodd-Frank Act moved to eliminate TBTF 
and on November 30, 2015 the final rule to codify the elimination TBTF was put in place.  We 
examine the market’s reaction to the elimination of TBTF for large banks.  
As banks deemed TBTF increased in value because of their special protection, we expect 
that the explicit elimination of TBTF will be accompanied by a loss in value for banks that the 
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market believes to be TBTF.  We implement an event-study analysis to determine the market’s 
reaction to the elimination of TBTF.  In particular, we want to determine how many banks and at 
what asset size the market considered these banks to have TBTF status since there is no explicit 
identification of TBTF banks.  
 The market reacted (at least somewhat) negatively to the passage of Dodd-Frank and to the 
elimination of TBTF, but the market reaction is not from the top down.  Instead, the reaction to 
Dodd-Frank is spread across all groups of banks and the reaction to the elimination of TBTF leans 
toward the smaller banks in our sample.   
Our results for the largest banks support the contention that the TBTF policy has not been 
eliminated for the very largest systemically important banks, and are consistent with popular press 
accounts to this effect.  For example, a recent article in the Wall Street Journal written after the 
final rule on TBTF was released, discusses the need to end TBTF once and for all.15
15 “Minneapolis Fed’s Kaskari says must consider options for ending ‘Too Big to Fail’,” article by Shayndi Raice, 
Wall Street Journal, April 4, 2016. 
  The article 
is about a conference the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President wants to hold in order 
to discuss the complete elimination of TBTF.  This article suggests that at least one member of the 
Federal Reserve Board believes that TBTF lives on, which is consistent with our results for the 
largest banks.  Also, our findings indicate that more work is needed to truly eliminate the TBTF 
policy for at least the largest banks, which are the banks whose failure during a severe crisis would 
have the largest impact on the economy.    
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Table 1 – List of the 55 banks in the final sample listed in order of decreasing total assets. Total assets are 
from December 2009.  
 
Bank Total Assets ($Bil.)   Bank 
Total Assets 
($Bil.) 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1,729.23  East West Bancorp, Inc. 20.56 
Bank Of America Corporation 1,653.45  First Bancorp 19.62 
Citigroup Inc. 1,260.91  Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 17.96 
Wells Fargo & Company 1,186.83  TCF Financial Corporation 17.92 
U.S. Bancorp 281.5  Webster Financial Corporation 17.7 
PNC Financial Services Group 260.31  Fulton Financial Corporation 16.71 
Bank Of New York Mellon Corp. 178.25  Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc. 16.34 
Capital One Financial Corp. 165.35  First Citizens Bancshares, Inc. 15.8 
SunTrust Banks, Inc. 164.34  Valley National Bancorp 14.26 
BB&T Corporation 159.68  MetLife, Inc. 14.11 
State Street Corporation 153.74  BancorpSouth, Inc. 13.16 
Regions Financial Corporation 138.01  Bank Of Hawaii Corporation 12.39 
Fifth Third Bancorp 112.74  UMB Financial Corporation 12.25 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 91.02  SVB Financial Group 12.19 
Keycorp 90.18  Wintrust Financial Corporation 12.19 
Northern Trust Corporation 81.46  Privatebancorp, Inc. 12.1 
Morgan Stanley 66.16  International Bancshares Corp. 11.67 
Discover Financial Services 65.86  Cathay General Bancorp 11.57 
Comerica Incorporated 59.16  MB Financial, Inc. 10.84 
Zions Bancorporation 52.32  Firstmerit Corporation 10.52 
Huntington Bancshares Inc. 51.11  Umpqua Holdings Corp. 9.38 
New York Community Bancorp 42.66  F.N.B. Corporation 8.5 
Synovus Financial Corp. 34.5  Iberiabank Corporation 8.11 
Popular, Inc. 34.14  Western Alliance Bancorp. 5.76 
Bok Financial Corporation 25.91  Bank Of The Ozarks Inc 2.76 
First Horizon National Corp. 25.84  Home Bancshares, Inc. 2.68 
American Express Company 24.17  United Bancshares, Inc. 0.62 
Associated Banc-Corp 22.56       
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Table 2- This table shows a timeline of the events used in this study beginning with January 5th, 2010 and 
ending with November 30, 2015.  Information from the event was collected from the source in the last 
column. 
 
Date Event Regulation Source 
5-Jan-10 1 Congress assembled to present and begin deliberations over The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act. 
Federal Reserve 
30-Jun-10 2 
The House approved the final Dodd-Frank proposal in 
the 111th Congress by a vote of 237 to 192.  This was the 
final bill sent to the Senate and eventually President 
Obama. 
Govtrack.us 
15-Jul-10 3 Dodd-Frank passed by the Senate and sent to President Obama for signing. Washington Post 
21-Jul-10 4 
Amendment to Dodd-Frank removing “general” 
emergency lending and replaced it with “limited” 
emergency lending was signed into law. 
Federal Reserve 
23-Dec-13 5 Notice of proposed ruling making and request for public comment on section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Federal Reserve 
13-Jan-14 6 
Letter from the House Committee on Financial Services 
to Fed Chair Bernanke raising concerns on the adequacy 
of the proposed rules for implementing section 1101 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Bloomberg News 
18-Aug-14 7 
Letter from Senators to Fed Chair Yellen raising 
concerns on the adequacy of the proposed rules for 
implementing section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Warren.senate.gov 
20-Nov-15 8 Federal Reserve staff sent internal memo to Board of Governors with final rule including staff recommendation. Federal Reserve 
30-Nov-15 9 
Final rules for implementing section 1101 of the Dodd-
Frank Act issued.  The Fed can no longer provide 
emergency funding to individual firms.  Additionally, no 
lending to insolvent firms.  Board must find “unusual 
and exigent circumstances” to authorize emergency 
credit programs. 
Federal Reserve 
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Table 3-This table reports the coefficient results from the SUR model from equation 1 (
∑
=
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9
1
1,,1,
k
ittkkititi IDRmR εηγβα ).  Control variables are omitted for readability.  The estimates for the 9 events are 
shown for each bank.  Each event number is shown in the top row and represents a column of parameter estimates for that event and 
its associated bank. The regression does not estimate a coefficient for banks with contaminating events on a bank-event basis.  The 
first column lists the bank or bank holding company with its associated total assets ($ Billions) listed in the second column.  Each 
of the events are listed in detail in table 2.  Dummy variables are equal to one for a five day window around the event day (the return 
on the day of the event a two day window around the event day) for all events except Event 4 when it is a four-day window (the day 
before the event, event day, and the two days after).  The main focus of the study revolves around events 1, 4, 5, and 9.  Event 1 is 
the presenting of the Dodd-Frank bill by congress on January 5, 2010.  Event 4 is amendment to Dodd-Frank removing “general” 
emergency lending and replaced it with “limited” emergency lending was signed into law.  Event 5 is the public announcement of 
the rules to implement section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Event 9 represents when the Fed confirmed it could no longer provide 
emergency funding to individual firms, and, additionally, no lending to insolvent firms.  The Federal Reserve Board would have to 
find “unusual and exigent circumstances” to authorize emergency credit programs.  Parameter estimate significance is identified 
with *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. 
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Bank  Total Assets  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 All Events 
JPMorgan Chase  1729.23 0.0016 -0.0047 -0.0068 -0.0005  -0.0026 0.0002 -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0015 
Bank Of America 1653.45  -0.0032 -0.027***  -0.0033  0.0000 -0.0046  -0.0059** 
Citigroup Inc. 1260.91 0.0019 0.0108* -0.0115** -0.0047 -0.0016 -0.0050 0.0008 -0.0027  -0.0005 
Wells Fargo  1186.83 0.0048 -0.0032 -0.0107** 0.0059 -0.0012 -0.0023 0.0005 -0.0028 -0.0021 -0.0010 
U.S. Bancorp 281.50 0.0046 -0.0008 -0.0089** 0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0008 0.0005 -0.0016 -0.0008 
Pnc Financial Services 260.31 0.0028 -0.0055 -0.014*** 0.0057 0.0007 -0.0026 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0013 
Bank Of NY Mellon 178.25 -0.0017 0.0034 -0.0082* -0.0063 0.0007 -0.0070 -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0021 
Capital One Financial 165.35 0.0119** -0.0053 -0.0148** -0.0093 0.0016 -0.0064 -0.0005 0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0019 
Suntrust Banks, Inc. 164.34 0.0082 -0.0086 -0.018*** 0.0093 0.0001 0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0028 -0.0005 -0.001 
BB&T Corporation 159.68 0.0062 -0.0072 -0.018*** -0.0125** 0.0016 -0.0007  0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0032** 
State Street  153.74 -0.0074 -0.0034 -0.0021 0.0078 -0.0001 -0.0060 -0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0015 
Regions Financial 138.01 0.0141** -0.0037 -0.019*** -0.0101 0.0009 0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0003 -0.0023 -0.0016 
Fifth Third Bancorp 112.74 0.0123** -0.0087 -0.024*** 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0008 0.0012 0.0019 0.0009 -0.0014 
Goldman Sachs   91.02 0.0009    0.0012 -0.0036 -0.0006 -0.0056  -0.0009 
Keycorp 90.18 0.0118** -0.0115* -0.0146** -0.0003 -0.0024 -0.0044 0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0020 
Northern Trust Corp. 81.46 -0.01*** 0.0008 -0.0056 -0.012*** 0.0047 -0.0064 -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0028 -0.0034** 
Morgan Stanley 66.16 0.0052 0.0004 -0.0071 0.0143**  -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0052 0.0058 0.0022 
Discover Financial  65.86 -0.0062 0.0045 -0.0033 -0.0005 -0.0054 -0.0040 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0044 -0.0021 
Comerica  59.16 0.0071 -0.0026 -0.017*** 0.0024 0.0011 -0.0039 -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0031 -0.0016 
Zions Bancorporation 52.32 0.041*** -0.0103 -0.018*** -0.019*** 0.0024 -0.0040 0.0015 -0.0037 -0.0015 -0.0004 
HuntingtonBanc 51.11 0.019*** -0.0077 -0.0079 0.0027 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0001 
New York Cmty 42.66 -0.0038 0.0059 0.0044 -0.0046 -0.0008 -0.0027 -0.0012 0.0027 0.0061 0.0010 
Synovus Financial 34.50 0.0220** -0.0124 -0.0201** -0.0227** -0.0023 0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0029 -0.0036 
Popular, Inc. 34.14 0.0115 -0.0144 -0.0194** -0.0119 0.0000 -0.0045 -0.0040 -0.0005 0.0020 -0.0040 
Bok Financial Corp. 25.91 -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0085* -0.0016 0.0029 -0.0043 -0.0011 -0.0026 -0.0045 -0.0025* 
First Horizon National 25.84 -0.0028 -0.0108* -0.016*** -0.0056 0.0008 -0.0026 0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0036 -0.0041** 
American Express  24.17 -0.0020 -0.0026 -0.0071 0.0104** 0.0025 -0.0061 -0.0002  -0.0023 -0.0010 
Associated Banc-Corp 22.56 0.0057 -0.0026 -0.0043 0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0023 -0.0017 0.0004 -0.0039 -0.0005 
East West Bancorp 20.56 -0.0031 0.0107* -0.0056 -0.0010 -0.0020 -0.0035 -0.0011 0.004 -0.0022 -0.0001 
First Bancorp 19.62 -0.0296* -0.059*** 0.0006 -0.0143 0.0115 -0.0084 -0.0074 -0.0140 -0.0127 -0.0147** 
Commerce Banc 17.96 -0.0030 0.0046 -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0014 0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0003 
Tcf Financial Corp 17.92 -0.0053 -0.0089 -0.023*** 0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0029 -0.0012 0.0004 -0.0028 -0.0045** 
Webster Financial 17.70 0.0005 -0.0063 -0.0109* -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0045 -0.0021 -0.0007 -0.0031 -0.0029 
Fulton Financial Corp. 16.71 -0.0081 -0.0015 -0.011** -0.0201*** -0.0032 -0.0059 0.0007 0.0014 -0.0051 -0.005*** 
Cullen/Frost Bankers 16.34 -0.0044 0.0022 -0.0075* -0.0019 0.0002 -0.0022 0.0005 0.0026 -0.0069* -0.0017 
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Bank  Total Assets  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 All Events 
First Citizens Banc 15.80 0.012** 0.0015 -0.006 0.0005 -0.0045 -0.0013 -0.0032 -0.0012 -0.0056 -0.0007 
Valley National Banc 14.26 -0.0018 0.0023 -0.0064 -0.0046 0.0009 -0.0043 -0.0003 0.0009 -0.0060 -0.0018 
Metlife, Inc. 14.11 0.0014 -0.0022 -0.0137*** 0.0036 0.0034 -0.0043 0.0013 -0.0041 0.0001 -0.0013 
Bancorpsouth, Inc. 13.16 -0.0087 0.0002 -0.0109 -0.0594*** -0.0013 -0.0066 -0.0025 0.0006 -0.0064 -0.009*** 
Bank Of Hawaii Corp. 12.39 -0.0053 0.0024 -0.0022 0.0038 -0.0010 -0.0022 -0.0010 0.0035 -0.0040 -0.0005 
Umb Financial Corp. 12.25 -0.0107** 0.0050 -0.0023 -0.0014 -0.0035 0.0007 -0.0035 0.0026 -0.0077 -0.0020 
Svb Financial Group 12.19 -0.0009 -0.0066 -0.0111* 0.0199*** -0.0036 -0.0031 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0075 -0.0018 
Wintrust Financial  12.19 -0.0055 -0.0105* -0.0139** -0.0196*** -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0063 0.0001 -0.00300 -0.006*** 
Privatebancorp, Inc. 12.10 -0.0012 0.0038 -0.0103 -0.0161* -0.0037 -0.0059 -0.0027 -0.0048 -0.0051 -0.0045* 
International Banc 11.67 -0.0068 -0.0001 -0.0139** -0.0061 -0.0047 -0.0049 -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0102* -0.0048** 
Cathay General Banc 11.57 0.0192*** -0.0049 -0.0089 -0.002 -0.0016 -0.0076 -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0062 -0.0012 
Mb Financial, Inc 10.84 -0.0088 -0.0043 -0.0063 -0.0287*** 0.0025 -0.0063 0.0004 0.0030 -0.0036 -0.0049** 
Firstmerit Corporation 10.52 0.0010 0.0008 -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0046 0.0012 -0.0047 -0.0013 
Umpqua Holdings 9.38 -0.0044 -0.0053 -0.0045 -0.0069 0.0018 -0.0087 -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0070 -0.0035* 
F.N.B. Corporation 8.50 -0.0029 -0.0048 -0.0136*** -0.0041 0.0004 -0.0060 -0.0033 0.0006 -0.0043 -0.0039** 
Iberiabank  8.11 -0.0092* 0.0017 -0.0081 -0.0163*** -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0031 -0.0001 -0.0057 -0.0043** 
Western Alliance  5.76 0.0048 -0.0193** -0.0129* -0.0182** -0.0002 -0.0107 -0.0030 -0.0028 -0.0057 -.007*** 
Bank Of The Ozarks  2.76 -0.0043 -0.002 -0.0029 -0.0015 0.0047 -0.0025 -0.0035 -0.0027 -0.0022 -0.0017 
Home Bancshares 2.68 -0.0060 0.0007 -0.0093 -0.0091 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0022 -0.0027 -0.0090 -0.004** 
United Bancshares 0.62 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0071 0.0024 -0.0032 0.0031 -0.0005 0.0020 0.0039 0.0001 
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Table 4 - This table reports the coefficient results from the SUR model from equation 1  
( ∑
=
++++=
9
1
1,,1,
k
ittkkititi IDRmR εηγβα ).  The dependent variable is the equal weighted average of the daily return for each 
group of banks.  Equal weighted market return and all events are listed in the first column.  We also include the event when the 
Federal Reserve raised the interest rate for borrowing from the discount window.  The model also removes banks from associated 
events with a contaminating event for an individual bank.  For example, for Event 1In Panel A, Columns 2 & 3 separate the sample 
between banks that are not Globally Systemically Important Banks (GSIB) and GSIBs.  Columns 5 & 6 separate the sample between 
banks not included in Stress-tests and those stress tested in February, 2009.  In Panel B, columns 1, 2, & 3 separate the sample by 
asset size of the bank.  Banks with under $50 billion in assets are shown in column 1.  Column 2 contains results for banks with $50 
billion to $1 trillion in assets.  Column 3 gives results for banks with greater than $1 trillion in assets.  Each of the events are listed 
in detail in table 2.  Dummy variables are equal to one for a five day window around the event day (the return on the day of the 
event a two day window around the event day) for all events except Event 4 when it is a four-day window (the day before the event, 
event day, and the two days after).  The main focus of this study revolves around events 1, 4, 5, and 9.  Event 1 is the presenting of 
the Dodd-Frank bill by congress on January 5, 2010.  Event 4 is amendment to Dodd-Frank removing “general” emergency lending 
and replaced it with “limited” emergency lending was signed into law.  Event 5 is the public announcement of the rules to implement 
section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Event 9 represents when the Fed confirmed it could no longer provide emergency funding to 
individual firms, and, additionally, no lending to insolvent firms.  The Federal Reserve Board would have to find “unusual and 
exigent circumstances” to authorize emergency credit programs.  The row “All DFA Events” provides the parameter estimate for a 
dummy variable equal to one, jointly for all events.  Both of the last two rows are separate regressions and also include the Market 
Return, as well as the interest rate dummy variable.  The table also includes a Wald Test for the differences between the coefficients 
from each group.  Parameter estimate significance is identified with *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. 
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Panel A: Regressions for GSIBs and Stress-tested banks using a 5 Day Window removing contaminating events 
 
GSIB 
 
Stress-tested Banks 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(2) - (1) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(2) - (1) 
 
NO YES 
 
Difference P-value 
 
NO YES 
 
Difference P-value 
Market Return 1.172*** 1.3104*** 
 
0.1384*** 0.0000 
 
1.1532*** 1.2768*** 
 
0.1236*** 0.0000 
DFA 1 0.0085** 0.0107*** 
 
0.0022 0.5267 
 
0.0071* 0.0129*** 
 
0.0058** 0.0361 
DFA 2 -0.0039 0.0004 
 
0.0043 0.2260 
 
-0.0035 -0.0028 
 
0.0007 0.8045 
DFA 3 -0.0076** -0.0014 
 
0.0063* 0.0729 
 
-0.0069* -0.0067** 
 
0.0002 0.9326 
DFA 4 -0.0057 -0.0034 
 
0.0023 0.5577 
 
-0.0063 -0.0031 
 
0.0032 0.2963 
DFA 5 0.0001 -0.0028 
 
-0.0029 0.4079 
 
0.0000 -0.0008 
 
-0.0008 0.7751 
DFA 6 -0.0005 0.0003 
 
0.0008 0.8154 
 
-0.0008 0.0006 
 
0.0014 0.6099 
DFA 7 -0.0036 -0.0027 
 
0.0008 0.8089 
 
-0.0038 -0.0026 
 
0.0012 0.6539 
DFA 8 -0.0009 -0.0037 
 
-0.0029 0.4110 
 
-0.0007 -0.0024 
 
-0.0017 0.5324 
DFA 9 -0.0010 0.0029 
 
0.0039 0.2688 
 
-0.0017 0.0023 
 
0.0039 0.1546 
Raising DW Rate -0.0006 0.0006 
 
0.0012 0.8272 
 
-0.0009 0.0006 
 
0.0015 0.7381 
            
ALL DFA EVENTS -0.0015 0.0001   0.0016 
    
0.1734   -0.0018 -0.0002   0.0015 0.1084 
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Panel B: Regressions for Asset size groups using a 5 Day Window removing contaminating events 
Asset Sizes 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(3) - (1) 
 
(3) - (2) 
 
(2) - (1) 
 
< $50 B $1 T > X >= $50 B >$1 T 
 
Difference P-value 
 
Difference P-value 
 
Difference P-value 
Market Return 1.144*** 1.2564*** 1.3528*** 
 
0.2089*** 0.0000 
 
0.0964*** 0.0000 
 
0.1123*** 0.0000 
DFA 1 0.0050 0.0161*** 0.0139*** 
 
0.0089** 0.0398 
 
-0.0022 0.4986 
 
0.0111*** 0.0000 
DFA 2 -0.0033 -0.0042 0.0001 
 
0.0034 0.4272 
 
0.0043 0.1895 
 
-0.0009 0.7449 
DFA 3 -0.0069* -0.0066* -0.0071 
 
-0.0002 0.9711 
 
-0.0005 0.8885 
 
0.0003 0.9091 
DFA 4 -0.0050 -0.0060 -0.0061 
 
-0.0011 0.8235 
 
0.0000 0.9910 
 
-0.0010 0.7261 
DFA 5 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0028 
 
-0.0030 0.4886 
 
-0.0023 0.4869 
 
-0.0007 0.7859 
DFA 6 -0.0009 0.0002 0.0017 
 
0.0026 0.5423 
 
0.0016 0.6349 
 
0.0011 0.6832 
DFA 7 -0.0038 -0.0029 -0.0021 
 
0.0017 0.6921 
 
0.0008 0.8155 
 
0.0009 0.7201 
DFA 8 -0.0006 -0.0020 -0.0038 
 
-0.0032 0.4572 
 
-0.0018 0.5720 
 
-0.0014 0.6062 
DFA 9 -0.0018 0.0018 0.0019 
 
0.0037 0.3946 
 
0.0002 0.9629 
 
0.0035 0.1826 
Raising DW Rate -0.0008 -0.0007 0.0041 
 
0.0049 0.4703 
 
0.0048 0.3472 
 
0.0001 0.9864 
             
ALL DFA EVENTS -0.0018 -0.0003 -0.0003   0.0015 0.3130   0.0000 0.9962   0.0015*    0.0995 
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Table 5 - This table reports the number of significant coefficient results from bank level regressions as shown in equation 1.  This 
table removes the contaminated events for each bank when estimating equation 1.  The last row tabulates the parameter estimates 
for a dummy variable equal to one, jointly for all events.  Panel A shows tabulated results from all banks, stress-tested banks, and 
GSIBs.  Panel B shows tabulated results based on the total asset size of the banks. These are counted and tabulated as significant in 
which direction or insignificant.  For example, in Panel A the first row under Event 1, out of the 55 bank regressions, 18 banks had 
positive and significant coefficient estimates, 1 bank had a negative and significant estimate, and 36 banks had insignificant 
coefficients. The dependent variable for the underlying regression is the equal weighted average of the daily return for each group 
of banks.  Event numbers are listed in the first column for both panels.  In Panel A, Columns 2, 3, & 4 represent the tabulations from 
all banks. Columns 5, 6, & 7 show tabulated results from the stress-tested banks.  Columns 8, 9, & 10 show tabulated results for 
GSIBs.   
Panel B separates the banks by total asset size.  Tabulated results for banks with under $50 billion in assets are shown in columns 
2, 3, & 4.  Columns 5, 6, & 7 contain tabulated results for banks with $50 billion to $1 trillion in assets.  Columns 8, 9, & 10 gives 
results for banks with greater than $1 trillion in assets.  The estimates for the 9 events are shown for each bank.  Each of the events 
are listed in detail in Table 2.  The main focus of this study revolves around events 1, 4, 5, and 9.  Event 1 is the presenting of the 
Dodd-Frank bill by congress on January 5, 2010.  Event 4 is amendment to Dodd-Frank removing “general” emergency lending and 
replaced it with “limited” emergency lending was signed into law.  Event 5 is the public announcement of the rules to implement 
section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Event 9 represents when the Fed confirmed it could no longer provide emergency funding to 
individual firms, no lending to insolvent firms, and “unusual and exigent circumstances” to authorize emergency credit programs.  
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PANEL A: INDIVIDUAL BANK LEVEL WITH 5 DAY WINDOWS AND CONTAMINATED EVENTS REMOVED 
  All (55 total)    Stress-tested (18 total)    GSIB (8 total)  
EVENT Positive Negative Insignificant  Positive Negative Insignificant Positive Negative Insignificant 
1 9 4 41  4  13    6 
2 2 5 47  1 1 15  1  6 
3 0 28 26   12 4   4 3 
4 3 11 39  2 1 13  1  6 
5 0 0 53    16    16 
6 0 0 54    17    17 
7 0 0 54    17    17 
8 0 0 54    17    17 
9 0 2 50       15       15 
ALL EVENTS 0 18 37     2 16     1 7 
 
PANEL B: INDIVIDUAL BANK LEVEL BY ASSET SIZE WITH 5 DAY WINDOWS AND CONTAMINATED EVENTS REMOVED 
  Total Assets <$50 Billion    $50 B < T.A. < $1 T    Total Assets > $1 Trillion  
EVENT Positive Negative Insignificant  Positive Negative Insignificant Positive Negative Insignificant 
1 3 3 28  6 1 10    3 
2 1 4 29   1 15  1  3 
3  14 20   11 5   3 1 
4 2 8 24  1 3 13    3 
5   34    16    3 
6   34    17    3 
7   34    16    4 
8   33    17    4 
9   2 32       16       2 
ALL EVENTS   15 20     2 15     1 3 
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Table 6-This table reports results from a cross-sectional regression for sample banks using 
individual a bank’s cumulative abnormal return for Event 3 as a dependent variable measured in 
percentages (i.e.. 1.2% not 0.012).  Total Assets is the natural log of total assets. Capital is the 
level of equity capital measured in billions of dollars. Deposit Ratio is total deposits divided by 
total assets. Loan Ratio is total loans divided by total assets. ROA is the annualized return on assets 
for bank for a quarter calculated as net income divided by total assets. GSIB and Stress-tested Bank 
are dummy variables equal to one if the bank is GSIB or Stress-tested bank respectively. Total 
Assets >$1T is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank’s total assets are greater than $1 trillion. 
The variable $1T <Total Assets >$1B is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank’s total assets 
are less than $1 trillion and greater than $1billion. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses and 
parameter estimate significance is identified with ***<1%, **<5%, and *<1%. 
 
 
 
VARIABLES   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Total Assets -0.0016** 0.0001  
 (0.025) (0.887)  
Capital -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0003*** 
 (0.401) (0.615) (0.000) 
Deposit Ratio -0.0099 -0.0058 -0.0085 
 (0.493) (0.665) (0.538) 
Loan Ratio -0.0067 -0.0144*** -0.0117** 
 (0.412) (0.003) (0.014) 
ROA 0.0529 0.0732 0.0549 
 (0.243) (0.119) (0.223) 
GSIB 0.0055   
 (0.221)   
Stress-tested Bank  -0.0064***  
  (0.005)  
Total Assets > $1T   0.0327*** 
   (0.001) 
$1T < Total Assets > $50B   -0.0010 
   (0.599) 
Constant 0.0278 0.0020 0.0047 
 (0.148) (0.915) (0.668) 
    
Observations 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.276 0.336 0.350 
 
